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Abstract—Data compression combined with effective
encryption is a common requirement of data storage
and transmission. Low cost of these operations is often
a high priority in order to increase transmission speed
and reduce power usage. This requirement is crucial
for battery-powered devices with limited resources, such
as autonomous remote sensors or implants. Well-known
and popular encryption techniques are frequently too
expensive. This problem is on the increase as machine-
to-machine communication and the Internet of Things are
becoming a reality. Therefore, there is growing demand
for finding trade-offs between security, cost and perfor-
mance in lightweight cryptography. This article discusses
Asymmetric Numeral Systems – an innovative approach to
entropy coding which can be used for compression with
encryption. It provides compression ratio comparable with
arithmetic coding at similar speed as Huffman coding,
hence, this coding is starting to replace them in new
compressors. Additionally, by perturbing its coding tables,
the Asymmetric Numeral System makes it possible to
simultaneously encrypt the encoded message at nearly
no additional cost. The article introduces this approach
and analyzes its security level. The basic application is
reducing the number of rounds of some cipher used on
ANS-compressed data, or completely removing additional
encryption layer if reaching a satisfactory protection level.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliable and efficient data transmission is a crucial
aim of communications. Modern telecommunication sys-
tems are facing a new challenge: security. Usually, data
confidentiality is implemented by additional services,
which are able to protect sensitive data against disclo-
sure. Unfortunately, cryptographic algorithms decrease
performance. Moreover, it is impossible to implement
security services in many systems with limited resources
(e.g., the Internet of Things). Therefore, system archi-
tects must find other ways to ensure data protection. One
such possibility is integration of encryption with other
data processing steps, such as source coding.
Prefix codes, such as the well-known Huffman cod-
ing [1], Golomb, Elias, unary and many others, are
Figure 1. Comparison of some well known compressors based on
Huffman coding (marked red) with those using ANS (marked green)
from [5] benchmark. ZSTD, lzturbo and zhuff use the tANS variant,
which allows to add encryption by perturbing coding tables.
the basis of data storage and transmission due to their
low cost. They directly translate a symbol into a bit
sequence. As the symbol of probability p generally
contains lg(1/p) bits of information (lg ≡ log2), prefix
codes are perfect for probabilities with a power of
1/2. However, this assumption is rarely true in prac-
tice. While encoding a sequence of {ps} probability
distribution with a coding optimal for {qs} distribution,
we use asymptotically ∆H =
∑
s ps lg(ps/qs) more
bits/symbol than required. This cost of inaccuracy is
especially significant for highly probable symbols. They
can carry nearly 0 bit/symbol of information, while
prefix codes have to use at least 1 bit/symbol.
Arithmetic and range coding ([2], [3]) avoid this cost
by operating on nearly accurate probabilities. However,
they are more costly and usually require multiplication,
which is an operation with a high computational com-
plexity. Using lookup tables to avoid multiplication is
achieved for example by CABAC [4] in H.264, H.265
video compressors. However, it operates on the binary
alphabet, requiring eight steps to process a byte.
Recently, a new multiplication-free large alphabet
entropy coder was proposed for low cost systems:
Asymmetric Numeral Systems (ANS) ([6], [7], [8]). In
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contrast to prefix codes, this coding uses nearly accurate
probabilities for coded symbols. The high performance
and efficiency of ANS is leading to Huffman and Range
being replaced in new compressors ([9], [10], [11]), in-
cluding Apple LZFSE [12] and Facebook Zstandard [13]
to improve performance. Figure 1 presents a comparison
of well known compressors based on Huffman coding
with compressors using the ANS algorithm. It shows that
this new entropy coder allows for compressors which
are many times faster both decoding and encoding for
comparable compression ratios. One of the reasons is
that, while Huffman coding requires costly sorting of
symbols to build the prefix tree, ANS initialization is
cheap: with linear time and memory cost. This advan-
tage is especially important for the cost of hardware
implementations, which improvements have been already
demonstrated for FPGA [14].
As well as providing effective data compression, an-
other basic requirement of data storage and transmission
is confidentiality. We are able to ensure data confiden-
tiality using symmetric ciphers (asymmetric cryptog-
raphy is not an appropriate solution in environments
with limited resources because of its high computational
cost). However, popular symmetric ciphers such as the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), turn out to be too
costly for many applications, especially battery-powered,
such as autonomous remote sensors or the Internet of
Things. As such, there is a growing field of lightweight
cryptography [15], [16], [17] – with a focus on low cost,
at a trade-off for having lower protection requirements.
Since a combination of compression and encryption
is a common requirement, the cost priority suggests a
natural solution of combining these two steps. Many
approaches were considered for adding encryption into
methods which are already a part of data compressors:
Lempel-Ziv substitution schemes [18], [19], Burrows-
Wheeler transform [20] and arithmetic coding [21], [22].
These articles contain some general techniques, which
addition might be considered to improve security of
discussed ANS-based encryption.
Huffman coding has also been discussed for adding
simultaneous encryption [23]. An abstract of an article
by Ronald Rivest et al. [24] concludes that: ”We find that
a Huffman code can be surprisingly difficult to cryptana-
lyze”. The main problem is the lack of synchronization –
the attacker does not know how to split the bit sequence
into blocks corresponding to symbols. Additionally, data
compression offers auxiliary protection by reducing re-
dundancy which could be used for cryptanalysis.
A Huffman decoder can be viewed as a special case
of the tabled variant of an ANS decoder, referred as
tANS [7]. This generalization allows for more complex
behavior and other features, which suggest that secure
encryption could be included inside the entropy coding
process. While the prefix code is a set of rules: ”symbol
→ bit sequence”, tANS also has a hidden internal state
x ∈ {2R, ..., 2R+1−1} for some R ∈ N, which acts as a
buffer containing lg(x) ∈ [R,R+1) bits of information.
The transition rules have the form
(symbol, state) → (bit sequence, new state)
Therefore, in comparison with Huffman coding, there is
an additional hidden variable x, which controls the bit
sequence to produce, including the number of produced
bits in this step: floor or ceiling of lg(1/p). As chaos
is seen as strongly linked to the security of cryptogra-
phy [25], [26], the authors discuss three sources of chaos
in evolution of this internal state, making its behavior
virtually unpredictable while incomplete knowledge.
As only a few ciphers like one-time pad can be
formally proven to be safe, practical encryption schemes
often require time to gain trust as being secure: by lack
of successful attacks. Hence, while there are some ar-
guments of strength of the proposed encryption scheme,
until gaining such trust it is suggested to be used together
with a convenient cipher like AES, for example with a
reduced number of rounds. Comparing Huffman-based
compression plus 10 round of AES, with tANS-based
compression+encryption plus 5 rounds of AES, we get
gain in both compression ratio and performance.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.
Section II introduces the ANS algorithm: coding and de-
coding as well as some examples of these steps. Section
III, presents the basic concept of including encryption
in tANS, and properties influencing security level: set
of cryptographic keys, chaotic behavior, etc. Section IV
describes the security features of this encryption method.
Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. ASYMMETRIC NUMERAL SYSTEMS (ANS)
This section introduce ANS, focusing on the tabled
variant (tANS). Further discussion and other variants of
ANS can be found in [7].
A. Coding into a large natural number
Let us first consider the standard binary numeral
system. It allows to encode a finite sequence of symbols
from the binary alphabet (si ∈ A = {0, 1}) into x =∑n−i
i=0 si2
i ∈ N. This number can be finally written as
length ≈ lg(x) bit sequence. This length does not depend
on exact values of symbols – this approach is optimized
for Pr(0) = Pr(1) = 1/2 symmetric case, when both
symbols carry 1 bit of information. In contrast, a {ps}
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Figure 2. Arithmetic coding (left) and ANS (right) seen as an asymmetrization of the standard numeral system - in order to optimize them
for storing symbols from a general probability distribution.
probability distribution symbol sequence carries asymp-
totically
∑
s ps lg(1/ps) bits/symbol (Shannon entropy),
and a general symbol of probability p carries lg(1/p)
bits of information. Hence, to add information stored
in a natural number x to information from a symbol
of probability p, the total amount of information will
be ≈ lg(x) + lg(1/p) = lg(x/p) bits of information.
This means that the new number x′ ∈ N containing both
information should be approximately x′ ≈ x/p, which
is the basic concept of ANS.
Having a symbol sequence encoded as x =∑n−i
i=0 si2
i, we can add information from a new symbol
s ∈ A in two positions: the most or the least significant.
The former means that the new number containing both
information is x′ = x + s2n. The symbol s chooses
between two large ranges for x′: {0, ..., 2n − 1} and
{2n, ..., 2n+1 − 1}. The symmetry of their lengths cor-
responds to the symmetry of informational content of
both symbols. As depicted in the left panel of Figure
2, arithmetic or range coding can be viewed as an
asymmetrization of this approach to make it optimal for
different probability distributions. They require operating
on two numbers, defining the currently considered range,
what is analogues to the need to remember the current
position n in the standard numeral system.
We can avoid this inconvenience by adding a new
symbol in the least significant position: C(s, x) = x′ =
2x+s. Old digits are shifted one position up. To reverse
this process, the decoding function is D(x′) = (s, x) = (
mod (x′, 2), bx′/2c). This approach can be viewed that
x′ is x-th appearance of an even (s = 0) or odd (s = 1)
number. We can use this rule to asymmetrize this ap-
proach to make it optimal for a different probability dis-
tribution. In order to achieve this, we need to redefine the
division of natural numbers into even and odd numbers,
such that they are still distributed uniformly, but with
the density corresponding to the assumed probability
distribution. More formally, for a probability distribution
{ps} we need to define a symbol distribution s : N→ A,
such that: |{0 ≤ x < x′ : s(x) = s}| ≈ x′ps. Then the
encoding rule is
x′ = C(s, x) is x-th appearance of symbol s.
and correspondingly for the decoding function D, such
that D(C(s, x)) = (s, x). The decoded symbol is s(x′)
and x is the number of appearance of this symbol. More
formally:
C(s, x) = x′ : s(x′) = s, |{0 ≤ y < x′ : s(y) = s}| = x
D(x′) = (s(x′), |{0 ≤ y < x′ : s(y) = s(x′)}|)
The right panel of Figure 2 depicts an example of such
a process for the Pr(0) = 3/4, Pr(1) = 1/4 probability
distribution. Starting with x = 1 symbol/state, we encode
successive symbols: 01111 into x = 47 or x = 18.
Then we can can successively use the decoding function
D to decode the symbol sequence in the reverse order.
ANS results in a lower representation than the standard
numeral system, since it better corresponds with the digit
3
distribution of the input sequence 01111.
There can be found arithmetic formulas using multi-
plication for such coding/decoding functions: uABS and
rABS variants for the binary alphabet, and rANS variant
for any large alphabet [7]. The range variant (rANS)
can be viewed as a direct alternative to range coding
with some better performance properties such as a single
multiplication per symbol instead of two, leading to
many times faster implementations [27]. However, since
it requires multiplication and is not suited for encryption,
this paper only discusses the tabled variant (tANS), in
which we put the entire coding or decoding function for
a range x ∈ I into a table.
B. Streaming ANS via Renormalization
Using the C function multiple times allows us to
encode a symbol sequence into a large number x.
Working with such a large number would be highly
demanding. In AC, renormalization is used to allow
finite precision, an analogous approach should be used
for ANS. Specifically, we enforce x to remain in a
fixed range I by transferring the least significant bits
to the stream (we could transfer a few at once, but this
is not convenient for tANS). A basic scheme for the
decoding/encoding step with included renormalization is:
Algorithm 1 ANS decoding step from state x
(s, x) = D(x) { the proper decoding function }
useSymbol(s) { use or store decoded symbol }
while x < L do
x = 2 · x+ readBit() {read bits until returning to I}
end while
Algorithm 2 ANS encoding of symbol s from state x
while x > maxX[s] do {maxX[s] will be found later}
writeBit(mod(x, 2)); x = bx/2c {write youngest bits}
end while {until we can encode symbol}
x = C(s, x) { the proper encoding function }
To ensure that these steps are the inverse of each other,
we need to make sure that the loops for writing and
reading digits end up with the same values. For this
purpose, let us observe that if a range has the form
I = {L, . . . , 2L − 1}, when removing (x → bx/2c)
or adding (x → 2x + d) the least significant bits, there
is exactly one way of achieving range I . For uniqueness
of the loop in Method 1, we need to use I range of this
type: I = {L, . . . , 2L − 1} where for practical reasons
we will use L = 2R. For uniqueness of the loop in
Method 2 we need to additionally assume that
Is = {x : C(s, x) ∈ I}
(
I =
⋃
s
C(s, Is)
)
are also of this form: Is = {Ls, . . . , 2Ls−1} and there-
fore maxX[s] = 2Ls − 1 which is used in Method 2.
C. Tabled variant (tANS)
In the tabled variant (tANS), which is used in most of
compressors in Fig. 1 and is interesting for cryptographic
purposes, we put the entire behavior into a lookup table.
Let us start with the following example: we construct
an L = 4 state automaton optimized for the Pr(a) =
3/4, Pr(b) = 1/4 binary alphabet, depicted in Figure 3.
We need to choose a symbol distribution s : I → {a, b}
for I = {4, 5, 6, 7}. To correspond to the probability
distribution, the number of symbol appearances should
be chosen as La = 3, Lb = 1. There now remain four
options to choose the s function. Let us focus on the
choice s(5) = b, s(4) = s(6) = s(7) = a, or in other
words: ”abaa” symbol spread. We need to enumerate the
appearances using the numbers Ia = {3, 4, 5}, Ib = {1},
getting the decoding function D(4) = (a, 3), D(5) =
(b, 1), D(6) = (a, 4), D(7) = (a, 5). It allows us to
obtain the decoded symbol and a new state. However,
some of these states are below the I range, therefore we
need to apply renormalization by reading some youngest
bits to return to I range. For example for x = 5, the
decoding function takes us to x = 1, so we need to read
two bits from the stream (d1, d2) to return to I , leading
to state x = 4 + 2d2 + d1.
Assuming the input source is i.i.d. Pr(a) =
3/4, Pr(b) = 1/4, we can find the probability distri-
bution of the visiting states of such an automaton: ρx in
this figure. It allows us to find the expected number of
bits/symbol: H ′ ≈ 1 ·1/4 ·2+(0.241+0.188) ·3/4 ·1 ≈
H + 0.01 bits/symbol, where H =
∑
s ps lg(1/ps)
is the minimal value (Shannon entropy). Generally, as
discussed in [7], ∆H = H ′ −H behave approximately
like m2/L2, where m is the size of the alphabet.
a) Connection with prefix codes: Using lookup
tables, the decoding procedure can be written as:
Algorithm 3 Decoding step for prefix codes and tANS
t = decodingTable[X] {X ∈ {0, .., 2R−1} is current state}
useSymbol(t.symbol) { use or store decoded symbol }
X = t.newX+readBits(t.nbBits) { state transition }
where X = x − L ∈ {0, .., 2R − 1} is a more
convenient representation. It should be noted that this
method can also be used for decoding prefix codes such
as Huffman coding. In this case R should be chosen as
the maximal length of the bit sequence corresponding to
a symbol. The state X should be viewed as a buffer con-
taining the last R bits to process. It directly determines
4
Figure 3. Example of 4 state tANS (top) and its application for stream coding (bottom). State/buffer x contains lg(x) ∈ [2, 3) bits of
information. Symbol b carries 2 bits of information, while a carries less than 1 - its information is gathered in x until it accumulates to a
complete bit of information. ρx are probabilities of visiting state x assuming the i.i.d. input source.
the symbol, which uses nbBits ≤ R bits of the buffer.
The remaining bits should be shifted and nbBits should
be read from the stream to refill the buffer:
decodingTable[X].newX = (X << nbBits) & mask
where << denotes left bit-shift operation and &mask
denotes restriction to the least significant R bits.
Just shifting the unused bits corresponds to assuming
that the produced symbol carried indeed nbBits bits of
information: has 2−nbBits probability. tANS works on
fractional amounts of bits by not only shifting the unused
bits, but also modifying them according to the fractional
amount of bits of information.
It should be noted that if we choose Ls = 2rs for
symbol of probability ≈ 2rs−R, and spread symbols in
ranges, our tANS decoder would become a decoder for
a prefix code. For example, ”aaaabcdd” symbol spread
would lead to decoder for a → 0, b → 100, c →
101, d → 11 prefix code. Therefore, prefix codes can
be regarded as a degenerated case of tANS.
D. Algorithms (tANS)
Let us now formulate the algorithms. Assume that
L = 2R: I = {L, . . . , 2L− 1}, Is = {Ls, . . . , 2Ls − 1}
and that qs := Ls/L ≈ ps approximates the probability
distribution of the symbols. There are |I| = 2R positions
for spreading symbols with |{x ∈ I : s(x) = s}| = Ls
appearances of symbol s. For convenient table handling,
we use X := x − L ∈ {0, . . . , 2R − 1} and store the
symbol spread as symbol[X] ≡ s(X + L) size L table.
Method 4 generates the decodingTable for efficient
decoding step from Method 3. For efficient mem-
ory handling while encoding step, the encoding table
can be stored in one dimensional form C(s, x) =
encodingTable[x + start[s]] ∈ I for x ∈ Is, where
start[s] = −Ls +
∑
s′<s Ls′ . To encode symbol s from
state x, we first need to transfer k[s] − 1 or k[s] bits,
where k[s] = dlg(L/Ls)e. This choice can be simplified
to nbBits = (x + nb[s]) >> r using a prepared
table nb[]. Finally, the preparation and encoding step are
written as Methods 5 and 6 respectively.
Algorithm 4 Generating tANS decodingTable
Require: next[s] = Ls {number of next appearance of symbol s}
for X = 0 to L− 1 do
t.symbol = symbol[X] { symbol is from spread function }
x = next[t.symbol] ++ { D(X +L) = (symbol, x) }
t.nbBits = R− blg(x)c { number of bits to return to I }
t.newX = (x << t.nbBits)− L { properly shift x }
decodingTable[X] = t
end for
Algorithm 5 Preparation for tANS encoding, L = 2R,
r = R+ 1
Require: k[s] = R− blg(Ls)c {nbBits = k[s] or k[s]− 1}
Require: nb[s] = (k[s] << r)− (Ls << k[s])
Require: start[s] = −Ls +
∑
s′<s Ls′
Require: next[s] = Ls
for x = L to 2L− 1 do
s = symbol[x− L]
encodingTable[start[s] + (next[s] + +)] = x;
end for
Symbol Spread Function: We need to choose
symbol[X] = s(X +L) distributing symbols over the I
range: Ls appearances of symbol s. Finding the optimal
way seems is a difficult problem. We present only a fast
5
Figure 4. Example of generation of tANS tables and applying them for stream decoding for m = 3 size alphabet and L = 16 states.
Algorithm 6 tANS encoding step for symbol s and state
x = X + L
nbBits = (x+ nb[s]) >> r {r = R+ 1, 2r = 2L}
useBits(x, nbBits) {use nbBits of the youngest bits of x}
x = encodingTable[start[s] + (x >> nbBits)]
simple way of spreading symbols in a pseudorandom
way in Method 7, which already offers excellent perfor-
mance. Several symbol spreads can be found and tested
in [28].
Algorithm 7 Example of fast symbol spread function
[29]
X = 0; step = 5/8L+ 3 { some initial position and step}
for s = 0 to m− 1 do
for i = 1 to Ls do
symbol[X] = s; X =mod(X + step, L)
end for
end for
III. ADDING ENCRYPTION
The construction of tANS code gives us an oppor-
tunity to ensure data confidentiality. The concept of
encryption in tANS coder is described in this section.
A. Basic concept
We could use the freedom of choosing the exact cod-
ing for encryption purposes. For example while building
prefix tree for a size m alphabet, there are m−1 internal
nodes. Switching their left and right children gives us
2m−1 options of encoding our message.
As discussed, prefix codes can be viewed as a tANS
for Ls being powers of 2 and symbols spread in ranges.
Without this restriction, there are much more options of
choosing the s function:(
L
L1, . . . , Lm
)
≈ 2L·H(L1/L,...,Lm/L)
where H(p1, . . . , pm) =
∑
i pi lg(1/pi) is entropy.
Each option defines a different coding. Therefore we
need a method of spreading symbols according to the
cryptographic key. One way is first to use an independent
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method, e.g. put successive symbol every step number of
positions (cyclically). Then we can perturb the obtained
symbol spread using a cryptographically-secure pseudo-
random number generator (CSPRNG) seeded with the
key, for example by taking blocks and cyclically shifting
symbols inside such blocks by a shift from the CSPRNG.
Figure 4 depicts an example of coding and encryption
processes for the following parameters: L = 16, m = 3
size alphabet, step = 5 and size B = 4 blocks.
After step 2, where we spread all symbols (globally),
the scrambling process in blocks is performed (locally).
This is crucial from the security point of view, since a
different locations of symbols results in different forms
of encoded messages. The encoded messages depend
strongly on the CSPRNG key.
B. Numbers of possibilities
The key space is a crucial element for protecting the
secure cipher against brute-force attacks, therefore we
analyze the number of ways of encoding messages.
As default parameters (DP), we consider L = 2048
states, m = 256 size alphabet and B = 8 blocks, which
requires 8kB of lookup tables (or 6kB with simple bit
compression). As degenerated default parameters (DDP),
we consider the worst case scenario: when there is one
dominating symbol and the remaining ones have the
minimal Ls = 1 number of appearances.
The number of different symbol spreads for DP is
22048H and depends on the entropy of the sequence. We
can use DDP to find the lower bound: the number of
symbol spreads here is L!(L−m+1)! ≈ 1.65 ·10837 for L =
2048, m = 256.
The assumed perturbation using cyclic shifts by values
from PRNG reduces these numbers. For DP, this number
is BL/B = 8256 ≈ 1.55 · 10231. Some cyclic shifts of
such blocks may accidentally lead to identical symbol
alignment. The probability that two B length blocks from
the i.i.d. {pi} probability distribution are accidentally
equal is approximately 2−BH(p1,...,pm). Therefore, for
practical scenarios (e.g. m = 256, H > 1), the reduction
of space of possibilities is practically negligible. For the
DDP case, approximately
(
L−m+1
L
)B ≈ 0.345 of blocks
have the dominating symbol only. The remaining ones
are always changed by the perturbation: the number of
possibilities is ≈ B(1−0.345)B/L ≈ 2.49 · 10151.
C. Chaotic state behavior
Having a large number of possible codings is not
sufficient; strong dependence on the key is also required.
One source is relying on the security of CSPRNG, which
ensures that changing a single bit in the key produces
a completely independent perturbation of the symbol
Figure 5. Three sources of chaotic behavior of the internal state x:
lg(x)→≈ lg(x) + lg(1/p) mod 1.
Figure 6. Example of probability distribution of X = x − L in
L = 2048 and m = 256 case and fast symbol spread.
spread. Additionally, eventual inferring the coding func-
tion would give no information about the key (seed).
Another source is chaos of dynamics of the internal
state x, ensuring that incomplete knowledge leads to a
rapid loss of any information about the state of the coder.
State x can be viewed as a buffer containing lg(x) bits
of information, and adding a symbol of probability s
increases it by lg(1/p) bits. Due to renormalization, this
addition is modulo 1 - accumulated complete bits are
send to the stream. Finally the approximate behavior is
lg(x)→≈ lg(x) + lg(1/p) mod 1.
This cyclic addition formula contains three sources of
chosity as depicted in Figure 5:
• asymmetry: each position may correspond to a
different symbol and so to a different shift,
• ergodicity: lg(1/p) is usually irrational, so even a
single symbol tends to cover the range uniformly,
• diffusivity: this formula is approximate, so even
knowing the symbol sequence, information about
the exact position is quickly lost.
These properties suggest that we should expect an ap-
proximately uniform probability distribution of lg(x),
which corresponds to Pr(x) ∝ 1/x distribution of x.
Better symbol spreads are close to this behavior. For the
discussed fast symbol spread, the noise around this 1/x
curve can be high, as shown in Figure 6.
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IV. FEATURES AND LIMITATIONS
The presented concept of lightweight compression
with encryption should be verified from the security
point of view. In this section, we discuss results of
standard cryptographic tests of tANS encoding with
encryption as well as presenting ways to of enhancing
the security of this solution. The tests were mainly
performed for the DP case: L = 2048, m = 256 for
pure tANS layer - imperfections can be easily removed
for example by a reduced number of layers of AES.
A. Balancing
The first question regarding the statistics of the pro-
duced bit sequence is the density of “0” and “1”. Are
they equal? In general, for ANS algorithm it is not
exactly fulfilled. This is due to the fact that the prob-
ability distribution of used states x prefers lower states:
approximately Pr(x) ∝ 1/x, such as in Figure 6. For
the DP case, tests show approximately 0.001 difference
(Pr(0) ≈ 0.501), it has never exceeded 0.002. For
different parameters, an approximate general behavior
of this difference is that it is proportional to m/L.
For higher correlations, the probability of a length
k bit sequence in the produced stream should be 2−k.
Beside the above difference, our tests could not detect
further disagreements with this rule.
The variable-length nature of ANS makes the Pr(0) ≈
0.501 issue unlikely to be useful for cryptanalysis (due
to the lack of synchronization). Additionally, this small
imbalance can be easily removed by adding an inexpen-
sive additional operation, such as XOR with a mask (or
set of masks) having equal number of zeros and ones.
B. Avalanche and nonlinearity
One crucial feature of the secure cipher is the Strict
Avalanche Criterion (SAC), which is satisfied if a change
of a single bit of the key results, on average, in a change
of one half of bits of ciphertext. The tANS approach
uses CSPRNG which has a similar property: changing a
single bit of the seed leads to a statistically independent
random stream, which means an independent tANS
coding table. We tested a property which is even stronger
than SAC: by encoding the same symbol sequence using
the same coding tables, but starting with a different initial
state. We were not able to detect statistical dependencies
between such two streams.
Additionally, we verified the nonlinearity of the en-
cryption process (defined as the Hamming distance to
the nearest affine function). The tests confirmed the
nonlinear behavior of encryption process.
C. Diffusion and completeness
The next important feature is the diffusion of changes
during the encryption process. We verified that even
when the number of changes in the entry were low, the
change of the output bits was high.
The same behavior was observed during the tests of
completeness. Completeness is satisfied when a change
of a single bit of the plaintext causes a change of around
one half of bits of ciphertext. The discussed method
processes successive single symbols, so a change of
a symbol can influence only bits corresponding to the
current and successive positions. We have performed
tests with two encoding streams starting with the same
state x. We first encode a single symbol different for each
streams, followed by a sequence of symbols identical
for both streams. Encoding a symbol of probability p
produces the youngest blg(1/p)c or dlg(1/p)e bits of x.
This means that the first few bits after the change of
symbol will be identical – their number depends on the
probability of symbol. Tests of further bits were not able
to find statistical dependencies.
Operating on short bit blocks (of varying length)
leaves an option for adaptive attacks by exploring cipher-
texts differing by single symbols. To protect against this,
the initial state can be chosen entirely randomly. We can
use such an initial state by analogy to the initial vector in
many modes of encryption, e.g. Cipher Block Chaining
(CBC). This way, the same symbol sequences lead to
independent bit sequences. As the number of the initial
state may be insufficient, this property can be enhanced
by adding a few random symbols at the beginning of
plaintext.
We can enhance this protection by making sure that
we use an independent coding table each time. This
can be achieved by using what is referred as ’salt’: a
random number which affects the seed of CSPRNG and
is stored in the header of a file. Additionally, the stream
is usually divided into frames of e.g. 10kB size, what is
common in data compression applications for updating
probability distributions. For encryption purposes, new
independent coding tables can be generated for each
frame, using the number of frame also as a seed.
Finally, we could use triple data: a cryptographic key,
the number of the frame and a random number (salt) as
the seed of CSPRNG.
Summarizing, the tests of features confirm that
presented solution is able to protect confidentiality
at a high level of security. We suggest the following
principles:
• using a relatively large number of states and a large
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alphabet (protecting against brute-force attacks),
• encrypting the final state, which is required for
decoding,
• using a completely random initial state to protect
against adaptive attacks (additionally, appending
a few random symbols at the beginning, which
are discarded by decoder, would strengthen this
protection).
During the implementation of proposed solution, it is
possible to strengthen the security level by:
• using three parameters: the cryptographic key, the
number of the data frame (e.g. 10kB) and a random
number stored in an encrypted file (salt) as a seed
for CSPRNG to make all coding tables completely
independent,
• using an inexpensive additional encryption layer,
such as XOR with a set of masks (generated us-
ing CSPRNG), a simple substitution-permutation
cipher, or AES with a reduced number of rounds.
Future work on proposed compression algorithm with
encryption process should focus on advanced cryptanaly-
sis and finding the optimal compromise between security
and performance.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a new concept of compression
with simultaneous encryption. From the data compres-
sion perspective, it provides a nearly optimal compres-
sion ratio (such as arithmetic coding) at an even lower
cost than Huffman coding (due to having inexpensive
linear initialization instead of the n log n cost of sorting
in Huffman coding). Using CSPRNG initialized with a
cryptographic key to choose the coding tables means
the message encoded this way can be simultaneously
encrypted at nearly no additional cost. The variable-
length nature of this coding makes eventual cryptanalysis
extremely difficult as the attacker does not know how
to split the bit sequence into blocks corresponding to
successive symbols. These blocks and even their lengths
depend on the internal state of the coder, which is hidden
from the attacker. The behavior of this state is chaotic,
rapidly eliminating any incomplete knowledge of the
attacker. Using CSPRNG ensures that even if an attacker
would obtain the applied coding table, no information
about the cryptographic key is acquired.
Such lightweight compression with encryption is cru-
cial in many situations, for example in battery-powered
remote sensors which should transmit the gathered data
in a compressed and secure manner. We are entering the
age of the Internet of Things, where the use of such
types of devices will be widespread. The hundreds of
potential applications of this solution include medical
implants transmitting diagnostic data, smart RFIDs pow-
ered by electromagnetic impulses only, smartphones or
smartwatches with improved performance and extended
battery life, and many other situations for data storage
and transmission.
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